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Abstract
In this paper we investigate a category of public key encryption
schemes which supports plaintext equality test and user-specified au-
thorization. With this newprimitive, twousers,whopossess their own
public/private key pairs, can issue token(s) to a proxy to authorize it
to perform plaintext equality test from their ciphertexts. We provide a
formal formulation for this primitive, and present a construction with
provable security in our security model. To mitigate the risks against
the semi-trusted proxies, we enhance the proposed cryptosystem by
integrating the concept of computational client puzzles. As a show-
case, we construct a secure personal health record application based
on this primitive.
1 Introduction
With the rapid advances in information technology, especially cloud com-
puting, organizations and individuals have begun to transfer their data
storage and processing from within their own organizational perimeters
to those of third-party service providers. For example, quite a number of
Internet-based personal health record (PHR) systems[23], such as Google
Health [19] and Microsoft HealthVault [20], have been proposed so far. As
a result of the transit, the outsourcers can successfully reduce their operat-
ing costs while providing better services. However, the downside is that,
as many security critics have already pointed out, e.g. in [22], there are
potential privacy risks for the outsourced data.
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To tackle the privacy concerns, researchers have intensively worked on
cryptographic encryption techniques that support operations on encrypted
data. In this paper, we are interested in a category of public key encryption
schemes, which supports plaintext equality test from ciphertexts generated
under different public keys. We use the term PKEET (i.e. “Public Key
Encryption supporting plaintext Equality Test”) to refer to this category of
public key encryption, and an informal description is given below.
Given a public key encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), suppose
that two users possess their public/private key pairs (PK, SK) and
(PK′, SK′) respectively. If this public key encryption scheme belongs
to the category of PKEET, then any entity can perform the following
test: Given Enc(M,PK) and Enc(M′,PK′) for any M and M′, test
whether M =M′ without knowing M or M′.
Previous Result. The concept of PKEET was proposed by Yang et al. [18].
Their formulation allows any entity to perform equality test, hence it lacks
an authorization mechanism for users to specify who can perform a plain-
text equality test. Inherently, it leads to the following security vulnerability.
Given a ciphertext Enc(M,PK), any entity can determine whetherM = M′
for anyM′ in themessage space (note that this is implied by the equality test
functionality). Considering the fact that ciphertexts are public information,
it means that, given a ciphertext, any entity can discover a considerable
amount of information about the plaintext. In many potential application
scenarios, such as the PHR systems described in Section 5, the users may
only want the privileged (or, semi-trusted) parties such as a hospital to per-
form the equality test, so that other un-privileged parties can learn nothing
about their plaintexts. Clearly, a secure PKEET cryptosystem under the
formulation in [18] may not suffice in these application scenarios.
Recently, Tang proposed the concept of PKEET with a fine-grained au-
thorizationmechanism [25]. In this primitive, twousersmust come together
to generate a tokenwhich allows aproxy to compare their ciphertexts. While
offering users with tight control over who can compare their ciphertexts,
this may be a burden in some situations. Suppose that a user wants a proxy
to compare his cipheretxtswith those of his n classmates, then the user needs
to generate a token with each of his classmates. And, the proxy needs to
store n tokens for ciphertext comparison. In this case, it makes sense to
have a PKEET with a simple or coarse-grained authorization mechanism.
This motivates the new primitive AoN-PKEET, which will be proposed in
this paper.
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Contribution. Wepropose anewprimitiveAoN-PKEET, i.e. all-or-nothing
PKEET, which introduces an authorization mechanism for users to specify
who can perform a plaintext equality test from their ciphertexts. With a
AoN-PKEET cryptosystem, every user can independently run the autho-
rization algorithm (the Aut algorithm in our formulation in Section 2) to
issue his token to some semi-trusted proxies. If a proxy receives the tokens
from both Alice and Bob, then it is able to perform a plaintext equality
test from their ciphertexts; otherwise, it cannot do so. We use the term
all-or-nothing because once a user, say Alice, has issued her token to a proxy,
then this proxy is potentially able to perform equality test between Alice’s
ciphertexts and the ciphertexts of any other user, say Bob. The only prereq-
uisite is that the proxy also obtains Bob’s token, yet whether Bob will issue
his token to the proxy is out of the control of Alice.
In the threatmodel ofAoN-PKEET,we consider two types of adversaries
whose main goal is to reveal information about the encrypted data (i.e.
violating the confidentiality).
1. Type-I adversary represents semi-trusted proxies, who have access to
both ciphertexts and users’ tokens. With respect to such an adversary,
wedefine thenotion ofOW-CCA security, namely one-waynessunder
a chosen ciphertext attack.
2. Type-II adversary represents all malicious entities, who only have
access to users’ ciphertexts. With respect to such an adversary, we
define the notion of IND-CCA, namely indistinguishability under a
chosen ciphertext attack.
We propose an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem, which achieves the OW-CCA
security against a Type-I adversary and the IND-CCA security against a
Type-II adversary. Both security properties are proven based on the Com-
putational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in the random oracle model.
To mitigate the potential risks against a Type-I adversary, we enhance the
proposed cryptosystem by integrating the concept of computational client
puzzles [14].
Based on AoN-PKEET,we construct a secure PHR application, in which
patients can encrypt their PHRs and outsource the ciphertexts to a third-
party Service Provider (SP). The SP is only required to be semi-trusted and
cannot recover the plaintext PHRs, but it can still recommend patients to
each other based on the encrypted PHRs. We note that a secure PKEET
cryptosystem formulated in [18] cannot achieve the same level of secu-
rity. Similarly, AoN-PKEET can also be used in building secure outsourced
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database applications, which have been outlined by Yang et al. for PKEET
[18]. In such applications, AoN-PKEET will also provide a higher level of
security guarantees than PKEET.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we formulate the concept of AoN-PKEET. In Section 3, we provide a
construction of AoN-PKEET and prove its security. In Section 4, we pro-
vide an enhancedAoN-PKEETcryptosystembased on computational client
puzzles. In Section 5, we construct a secure personal health record (PHR)
application based onAoN-PKEET. In Section 6, we briefly review the related
work. In Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2 Formulation of AoN-PKEET
AnAoN-PKEETcryptosystemconsists of the algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec),
which are similar to those of standard public key encryption (PKE), as well
as two new algorithms (Aut,Com). The algorithms are defined as follows.
• KeyGen(`): This algorithm takes a security parameter ` as input, and
outputs a public/private key pair (PK, SK). LetM denote the message
space.
• Enc(M,PK): This algorithm takes a message M ∈ M and the public
key PK as input, and outputs a ciphertext C.
• Dec(C, SK): This algorithm takes a ciphertext C and the private key
SK as input, and outputs the plaintextM or an error message ⊥.
Let all the potential users be denoted as Ui (i ≥ 1), who adopt the above
public key encryption scheme. For any i, suppose that Ui’s key pair is
denoted as (PKi, SKi). It is required that all users use the same message
spaceM. The Aut and Com algorithms are defined as follows.
• Aut(SKi): This algorithm takes theprivate keySKi as input andoutputs
a token Ti.
• Com(Ci,C j,Ti,T j): This algorithm takes two ciphertexts Ci,C j and
two tokens Ti,T j as input, and outputs 1 if Mi = M j or 0 otherwise.
Note that Ci,C j are two ciphertexts encrypted under PKi and PK j
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respectively, and Ti,T j are the tokens from Ui and U j respectively. As
a special case, if the proxywants to perform equality test betweenUi’s
ciphertexts, it only needs Ti to run Com.
In the algorithm definitions, besides the explicitly specified parameters,
other public parameters could also be specified and be implicitly part of the
input. We omit those parameters for the simplicity of description.
Similar to the study of PKE schemes [2], an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem
should be sound (or, correct). Informally, this property means that the
algorithms Dec and Com work properly with valid inputs. Formally, it is
defined as follows.
Definition 1 An AoN-PKEET cryptosystem achieves (unconditional) soundness
if the following two equalities hold for any i, j ≥ 1 andM,M′ ∈ M. Let (PKi, SKi) =
KeyGen(`) and (PK j, SK j) = KeyGen(`).
1. Dec(Enc(M,PKi), SKi) =M and Dec(Enc(M′,PK j), SK j) =M′.
2. Com(Enc(M,PKi),Enc(M′,PK j),Aut(SKi),Aut(SK j)) is equal to 1 if M =
M′, and 0 otherwise.
Besides the soundness property, we will define the security model and
security properties for an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem in the following sub-
sections.
Throughout the paper, we use “||” to denote the concatenation operator
and use x ∈R X to denote that x is chosen from X uniformly at random.
2.1 The Threat Model
To facilitate our formal discussions, we make the following assumptions.
All users honestly generate their public/private key pairs. Every token is
sent to the proxy securely without being eavesdropped on by an outsider.
Every proxy can serve multiple users to perform equality test. For any
honest userUt, where t ≥ 1, he semi-trusts the proxies chosen by himself in
the following sense.
1. The proxies will faithfully follow the protocol specifications in per-
forming plaintext equality tests.
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2. When considering message security, the proxies may behave ma-
liciously. For example, in order to gain more information about
Enc(M,PKt), the proxies may send a string R to Ut to get the de-
cryption result (this corresponds to the query to the decryption oracle
in the security formulation shown in Figure 2).
3. Clearly, the proxies have more power than any other third-party ad-
versary since they have access to Ut’s token. We assume the proxies
will not collude with others to disclose Ut’s information. This is a
natural assumption because in practice a user may trust one entity
more than another one. As a result, it leads us to consider two types
of adversaries in our formulation, as detailed below.
With respect to an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem, for any honest user Ut,
where t ≥ 1, we consider two types of adversaries, namely Type-I and
Type-II adversaries as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: An Illustration of AoN-PKEET
1. Type-I adversary represents the semi-trusted proxies to which Ut has
assigned his token. In addition, this type of adversary has access to
the ciphertexts of all users. Referring to Figure 1, Proxy I and Proxy L
are Type-I adversary.
2. Type-II adversary represents all possibly malicious entities in the sys-
tem from the perspective of Ut. In contrast to Type-I adversary, this
type of adversary only has access to the ciphertexts of all users. Re-
ferring to Figure 1, such an adversary represents Ui (i ≥ 1, i , t), the
untrusted proxies and any other outsider.
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2.2 OW-CCA Security against a Type-I Adversary
As to the power of a Type-I adversary, it receives Ut’s token and may
also obtain some information about Ut’s plaintexts (i.e., has access to Ut’s
decryption oracle). In the context of AoN-PKEET, in the presence of a Type-
I adversary, standard indistinguishability notions, such as IND-CCA and
IND-CPA [2], cannot be achieved because of the desired plaintext equality
test functionality. Therefore, we define the notion of one-wayness under a
chosen ciphertext attack (OW-CCA).
As shown in Figure 2, the definition follows the conventional way,
namely through an attack game between an adversary and a challenger
which simulates the activities of the honest userUt.
1. The challenger runs KeyGen to generate a public/private key pair
(PKt, SKt).
2. Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to issue the following types of
oracle queries.
(a) Dec query with data C as input: the challenger returns
Dec(C, SKt).
(b) Aut query: the challenger returns Aut(SKt).
At some point, the adversary asks the challenger for a challenge.
3. Challenge phase: The challenger chooses a message Mt ∈R M and
sends C∗t = Enc(Mt,PKt) to the adversary.
4. Phase 2: The adversary is allowed to issue the same types of oracle
queries as in Phase 1. In this phase, the adversary’s activities should
adhere to the following restriction: The Dec oracle should not have been
queried with the data C∗t . At some point, the adversary terminates by
outputting a guessM′t.
Figure 2: The Game for OW-CCA
Definition 2 An AoN-PKEET cryptosystem achieves OW-CCA security against
a Type-I adversary, if, for any t ≥ 1, any polynomial-time adversary has only a
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negligible advantage in the attack game shown in Figure 2, where the advantage is
defined to be Pr[M′t =Mt].
2.3 IND-CCA Security against a Type-II Adversary
In the presence of a Type-II adversary, we define the notion of standard
IND-CCA security. This definition is essentially identical to a standard one
for public key encryption schemes. For clarity, we rephrase it in Figure 3.
1. The challenger runs KeyGen to generate a public/private key pair
(PKt, SKt).
2. Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to issue the following types of
oracle queries.
(a) Dec query with data C: the challenger returns Dec(C, SKt).
At some point, the adversary sends two messages M0,M1 of equal
length fromM to the challenger for a challenge.
3. Challenge phase: The challenger selects b ∈R {0, 1} and sends C
∗
t =
Enc(Mb,PKt) to the adversary.
4. Phase 2: The adversary is allowed to issue the same types of oracle
queries as in Phase 1. In this phase, the adversary’s activities are
subject to the following restriction: The Dec oracle should not have been
queried with the data C∗t . At some point, the adversary terminates by
outputting a guess b′.
Figure 3: The Game for IND-CCA
Compared with the OW-CCA definition against a Type-I adversary, the
main difference here is that a Type-II adversary is not allowed to query the
Aut oracle, namely without any access to Ut’s token.
Definition 3 AnAoN-PKEET cryptosystem achieves IND-CCA security against
a Type-II adversary, if, for any t ≥ 1, any polynomial-time adversary has only a
negligible advantage in the attack game shown in Figure 3, where the advantage is
defined to be |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 |.
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We have defined the CCA security against Type-I and Type-II adver-
saries. In both cases, it is straightforward to define the CPA security by
simply disallowing the adversary’s access to the Dec oracle in the attack
games. We omit the detailed definitions in this paper.
2.4 Offline Message Recovery Attack
Note that since a Type-I adversary has access to Ut’s token Tt, then given
a ciphertext Enc(M,PKt) it can test whether M′ = M holds for any M′ by
checking the following equality
Com(Enc(M,PKt),Enc(M′,PKt),Tt,Tt) = 1.
Therefore, in the extreme situation when the actual message space M′ is
polynomial size or the min-entropy of the message distribution is much
lower than the security parameter, for AoN-PKEET, a Type-I adversary (or,
semi-trusted proxies) is capable of mounting an offline message recovery
attack by checking every M′ ∈ M′. For example, let the message space be
the names of all diseases we know in the medical domain (as shown in the
PHR application in Section 5), then it falls into the extreme situation.
This type of attack is unavoidable due to the desired plaintext equality
test functionality, similar to the offline keyword guessing attack in the case
of PEKS (or searchable encryption) [8, 16]. However, comparedwith PKEET
formulated in [18], where any entity can mount the attack, our formulation
achieves a significant security improvement because a Type-II adversary
is unable to mount the attack. We further note that although an offline
message recovery attack is theoretically unavoidable in the presence of
a Type-I adversary, but, depending on the specific cryptosystem, certain
countermeasure can be employed to mitigate such an attack. In Section 4,
we propose a countermeasure based on computational client puzzles [14]
to secure the AoN-PKEET cryptosystem proposed in the next section.
3 The Proposed AoN-PKEET Cryptosystem
Note that an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem needs to achieve two functionali-
ties: one is to enable a user to decrypt the ciphertext generated under his
public key, the other is to enable a proxy to perform equality test on two ci-
phertexts. An immediate attempt of design is to combine a standard public
key encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) with a deterministic one-way
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function, such as a hash function H. Let userUi have two key pair (PKi, SKi)
and (PK′
i
, SK′
i
), set the ciphertext for a messageM to be
C = Enc(M,PKi),Enc(H(M),PK′i ).
To assign his token to a proxy, Ui sends SK
′
i
to the proxy. However, this
attempt does not achieve OW-CCA against a Type-I adversary under Def-
inition 2 even if the standard PKE scheme is IND-CCA secure, because an
attacker can manipulate a ciphertext without being noticed by the decryp-
tor. To obtain the message in C, the attack is simply to query
Enc(M,PKi),Enc(H(M′),PK′i ),
where M′ is a message chosen by the attacker. Such an attack may be
mitigated by asking the user to check whetherH(M′) = H(M) in the decryp-
tion, but this will leak the information whetherM = M′ which means that
IND-CCA security still will not be achieved.
In this section,wepropose anAoN-PKEET cryptosystem,which inherits
the basic idea of the above attempt and is not only more efficient but also
secure in our security model.
3.1 The Proposed AoN-PKEET Cryptosystem
LetG be a multiplicative group of prime order p, g be a generator ofG, ` be
a security parameter, and H1,H2,H3 be three cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m+d, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` ,
where m is a polynomial in `, {0, 1}m is the message space, and d is the
bit-length of p. The values of (`,G, g, p,m,H1,H2,H3) serve as the global
parameters for theAoN-PKEETcryptosystem. Inpractice, theseparameters
could be publicly standardized.
The intuition behind our construction is that, when encrypting a mes-
sage, the encryption algorithm encrypts both the message and a checksum
of this message, where the checksum is computed with a one-way function
from the message. When a user wants to assign her token, he discloses
part of his private key to a proxy so that the latter can recover the check-
sum but not the message. In the following, we first define the algorithms
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec).
• KeyGen(`): This algorithm outputs a private key SK = (x, y), where
x, y ∈R Zp, and the corresponding public key PK = (g
x, gy).
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• Enc(M,PK): This algorithmoutputs a ciphertextC = (C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)),
where
u, v ∈R Zp, C
(1) = gu, C(2) = gv, C(3) = H1(gux) ⊕M||u,
C(4) = gH2(g
vy)+M, C(5) = H3(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M||u).
• Dec(C, SK): This algorithm first computes M′||u′ = C(3) ⊕ H1((C(1))x),
and then check the following
1. gu
′
= C(1),
2. H3(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M′||u′) = C(5).
If all checks pass, outputM′, otherwise output an error message ⊥.
Suppose that every user Ui, for i ≥ 1, adopts the above public key
encryption scheme. To facilitate our description, we use the index i for all
the variables in defining Ui’s data. For example, Ui’s key pair is denoted
as (PKi, SKi), where SKi = (xi, yi) and PKi = (g
xi , gyi ), and Ui’s ciphertext
Ci = (C
(1)
i
,C
(2)
i
,C
(3)
i
,C
(4)
i
,C
(5)
i
) is written in the following forms.
C
(1)
i
= gui , C
(2)
i
= gvi , C
(3)
i
= H1(guixi) ⊕Mi||ui,
C
(4)
i
= gH2(g
viyi )+Mi , C
(5)
i
= H3(C(1)i ||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui).
Suppose thatUiwants aproxy toperformequality test onhis ciphertexts,
then he runs the following Aut algorithm to generate the token Ti for the
proxy.
• Aut(SKi): This algorithm returns a token Ti = yi.
Suppose that a proxy has received the tokens Ti and T j, then it can run
the following Com algorithm to perform equality test on the ciphetexts Ci
and C j, which are encrypted under PKi and PK j respectively.
• Com(Ci,C j,Ti,T j): This algorithm outputs 1 if C(4)i · g
−H2((C(2)i )
Ti ) = C
(4)
j
·
g
−H2((C(2)j )
Tj )
or 0 otherwise.
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It is straightforward to verify that the soundness property is achieved,
namely the Dec and Com work properly. We skip the details here.
We now briefly compare the efficiency with that of the PKEET cryp-
tosystem [18]. A ciphertext of the proposed AoN-PKEET cryptosystem
contains 5 elements, which is larger than that of the PKEET cryptosystem
in which case the ciphertext contains 3 elements. A detailed computational
complexity comparison is shown in Table 1. Note that Exp denotes an
exponentiation, which is much less cheaper than a Pairing operation.
Encryption Decryption Equality Test
AoN-PKEET 4 Exp 2 Exp 2 Exp
PKEET 2 Exp 3 Exp 2 Pairing
Table 1: Computational Complexity Comparison
3.2 Security Analysis
Following the work by Bellare and Rogaway [3], we use random oracle to
model hash functions in our security analysis. A function P(k) : Z → R is
said to be negligible with respect to k if, for every polynomial f (k), there
exists an integer N f such that P(k) <
1
f (k) for all k ≥ N f . The security of
the proposed AoN-PKEET cryptosystem relies on the CDH assumption,
defined as follows.
Definition 4 Let G be a multiplicative group of prime order p, g be a generator
of G, and ` be a security parameter. The CDH assumption holds if, given ga
and gb where a, b ∈R Zp, any polynomial-time adversary can compute g
ab with a
negligible probability with respect to `.
Next, we prove two theorems with respect to the OW-CCA and IND-
CCA security properties of the proposed AoN-PKEET cryptosystem.
Theorem 1 The proposed AoN-PKEET cryptosystem is OW-CCA secure against
a Type-I adversary based on the CDH assumption inG in the random oracle model.
Proof sketch. Suppose that an adversary has the advantage  the attack
game shown in Figure 2. The security proof is done through a sequence of
games [15].
Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol
execution and answers the oracle queries from the adversary, and all hash
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functions are treated as random oracles. Let 0 = Pr[M
′
t = Mt]. Clearly,
0 =  holds.
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in
Game0 except that it aborts the game if any of the random oracles returns
the same output with two different inputs (referred to as the event Ent1).
Clearly, Pr[Ent1] is negligible if the hash functions are modeled as random
oracles. Let 1 = Pr[M
′
t =Mt]. From the Difference Lemma in [15], we have
|1 − 0| ≤ Pr[Ent1].
Game2: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in
Game1 except that the following event Ent2 occurs. If the adversary queries
the decryption oracle Dec with C = (C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)), the challenger
returns ⊥ if there is not an input C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M||u to H3 such that the
oracle returns C(5). Clearly, Pr[Ent2] is negligible if the hash functions are
modeled as random oracles. Let 2 = Pr[M
′
t = Mt] in this game. From the
Difference Lemma in [15], we have |2 − 1| ≤ Pr[Ent2].
Game3: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in
Game2 except that, if the adversary queriesDecwithC = (C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)),
the challenger does the following. Check the queries to the oracle H3 to see
whether whether there is an input C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M′||u′ satisfying
H3(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M′||u′) = C(5), gu
′
= C(1),
M′′||u′′ = H1(gu
′xt ) ⊕ C(3), M′′ =M′ u′′ = u′.
If so returnM′, otherwise return⊥. This game is in fact identical to Game2.
Let 3 = Pr[M
′
t =Mt] in this game, then 3 = 2.
Game4: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in
Game3 except that the challenge C∗t is generated as follows.
C
(1)
t = g
ut , C
(2)
t = g
vt , δ ∈R {0, 1}
m+d, C
(3)
t = δ,
C
(4)
t = g
H2(gvtyt )+Mt , C(5)t = H3(C
(1)
t ||C
(2)
t ||C
(3)
t ||C
(4)
t ||Mt||ut).
This game is identical toGame3 unless the eventEnt3 occurs, namely gutxt is
queried to the random oracle H1. Note that the private key xt is never used
to answer the adversary’s queries. Therefore, Pr[Ent3] is negligible based on
the CDH assumption inG. Let 4 = Pr[M
′
t =Mt] in this game. The rationale
is quite straightforward. Suppose the Pr[Ent3] is non-negligible then the
challenger can solve the CDH problem with the probability Pr[Ent3]: given
a CDH challenge (ga, gb), the challenger sets gxt and gut to be ga and gb
respectively, and then randomly chooses an input to the random oracle H1
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as a guess for gab. From the Difference Lemma in [15], we have |4 − 3| ≤
Pr[Ent3].
Since H3 is modeled as a random oracle, it is clear that 4 is negligible if
the discrete log computation is infeasible which is certainly true based on
the CDH assumption. From the above analysis, we have that  ≤ Pr[Ent1]+
Pr[Ent2] + Pr[Ent3] + 4, which is negligible based on the CDH assumption
in the random oracle model. The theorem now follows. 
Theorem 2 The proposed AoN-PKEET cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure against
a Type-II adversary based on the CDHassumption inG in the random oracle model.
Proof sketch Suppose an adversary has the advantage  the attack game
shown in Figure 3. The security proof is done through a sequence of games
[15].
Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol
execution and answers the oracle queries from the adversary, and all hash
functions are treated as random oracles. Let 0 = Pr[b
′ = b]. Clearly,
|0 −
1
2 | =  holds.
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in
Game0 except that it aborts the game if any of the random oracles returns
the same output with two different inputs (referred to as the event Ent1).
Clearly, Pr[Ent1] is negligible if the hash functions are modeled as random
oracles. Let 1 = Pr[b
′ = b]. From the Difference Lemma in [15], we have
|1 − 0| ≤ Pr[Ent1].
Game2: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in
Game1 except that the following event Ent2 occurs. If the adversary queries
the decryption oracle Dec with C = (C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)), the challenger
returns ⊥ if there is not an input C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M||u to H3 such that the
oracle returns C(5). Clearly, Pr[Ent2] is negligible if the hash functions are
modeled as random oracles. Let 2 = Pr[b
′ = b] in this game. From the
Difference Lemma in [15], we have |2 − 1| ≤ Pr[Ent2].
Game3: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in
Game2 except that, if the adversary queriesDecwithC = (C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)),
the challenger does the following. Check the queries to the oracle H3 to see
whether there is an input C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M′||u′ satisfying
H3(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M′||u′) = C(5), gu
′
= C(1),
M′′||u′′ = H1(gu
′xt ) ⊕ C(3), M′′ =M′ u′′ = u′.
If so returnM′, otherwise return⊥. This game is in fact identical to Game2.
Let 3 = Pr[b
′ = b] in this game, then 3 = 2.
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Game4: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in
Game3 except that the challenge C∗t is generated as follows.
C
(1)
t = g
ut , C
(2)
t = g
vt , δ ∈R {0, 1}
m+d, C
(3)
t = δ,
Γ ∈R G, C
(4)
t = Γ, C
(5)
t = H3(C
(1)
t ||C
(2)
t ||C
(3)
t ||C
(4)
t ||Mt||ut).
This game is identical toGame3 unless the eventEnt3 occurs, namely gutxt is
queried to the random oracle H1 or gvtyt is queried to the random oracle H2.
Note that the private keys xt, yt are never used to answer the adversary’s
queries. Therefore, Pr[Ent3] is negligible based on the CDH assumption in
G. Let 4 = Pr[M
′
t = Mt] in this game. The rationale is the same as that in
the analysis of Game4 in proving Theorem 1. From the Difference Lemma
in [15], we have |4 − 3| ≤ Pr[Ent3].
Since H3 is model as a random oracle, it is clear that |4 − 12 | is negligible.
From the above analysis, we have that |0 − 4| ≤ Pr[Ent1] + Pr[Ent2] +
Pr[Ent3], which is negligible in the random oracle model based on the CDH
assumption in G. Note that  = |0 −
1
2 | and |4 −
1
2 | is negligible, then  is
negligible. The theorem now follows. 
4 An Enhanced AoN-PKEET Cryptosystem
In this section, we propose an enhanced AoN-PKEET cryptosystem based
on the computational client puzzle scheme proposed in [14] to mitigate the
offline message recovery attack, which is discussed in Section 2.4.
4.1 Offline Message Recovery Attack
In Section 2.4, we have shown a generic offline message recovery attack
against any AoN-PKEET cryptosystem. Referring to the AoN-PKEET cryp-
tosystem proposed in Section 3.1, from a ciphertext Enc(M,PKt), a Type-I
adversary with the token Tt can obtain g
M. As a result, a more efficient
approach to mount the attack is to pre-compute {gM
′
|M′ ∈ M′}, then the
attack is simply a table lookup.
It is worth noting that only a Type-I adversary is capable ofmounting an
offline message recovery attack. Comparedwith PKEET formulated in [18],
where any adversary can mount the attack, AoN-PKEET (and the proposed
AoN-PKEET cryptosystem) achieves a significant security improvement.
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4.2 The Enhanced AoN-PKEET Cryptosystem
As shown in the previous subsection, a Type-I adversary (or, a semi-trusted
proxy) can mount the attack in a brute-force manner, namely try all the
possible messages until finding a match. In theory, this type of attack is
unavoidable due to the desired equality test functionality. Based on these
facts, to mitigate the attack, a natural direction is to make the attack compu-
tationally expensive so that it will become computationally impossible for
the adversary to mount the attack. To achieve the purpose, we make use of
the computational client puzzle schemes [14, 24], which enable a prover to
prove to a verifier that a certain amount of computing resources has been
dedicated to solve a puzzle. The intuition is that the adversary is forced to
solve a puzzle before being able to test a possible message.
In the enhanced cryptosystem, we choose the RSW scheme in [14], be-
cause it is proven secure and is deterministic and immune to parallel attacks
[17]. These properties guarantee that a Type-I adversary cannot accelerate
the attack by employing multiple computers to work in parallel. As in the
original cryptosystem proposed in Section 3, the enhanced cryptosystem
requires the same global parameters (`,G, g, p,m,H1,H2,H3). In addition,
Q · T, a puzzle hardness parameter L (detailed below), and a hash function
UH : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗
Q·T
are also published, where Q,T are two large primes.
These additional parameters are required by the computational client puz-
zle scheme [14]. Note that the generation ofQ ·T could be bootstrapped by
a party trusted by all users in the system, and threshold techniques (e.g. [7])
can be used to improve the security. Nevertheless, this trust assumption is
not required for achieving the OW-CCA and IND-CCA security properties.
The algorithm KeyGen is identical to that in the original scheme, while
the algorithms Enc and Dec are redefined as follows.
• Enc(M,PK): This algorithmoutputs a ciphertextC = (C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)),
where
u, v ∈R Zp, C
(1) = gu, C(2) = gv, C(3) = H1(gux) ⊕M||u,
C(4) = (H2(gvy) + H2((UH(M))2
L
mod Q · T)) mod p,
C(5) = H3(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M||u).
• Dec(C, SK): This algorithm first computes M′||u′ = C(3) ⊕ H1((C(1))x),
and then checks the following
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1. gu
′
= C(1),
2. H3(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M′||u′) = C(5).
If all checks pass, outputM′, otherwise output an error message ⊥.
Compared with the original encryption and decryption algorithms, the
maindifference lies in computingC(4), where the encryptor needs toperform
Lmultiplications in computing (UH(M))2L mod Q ·T to formC(4). Let every
user Ui, for i ≥ 1, adopt the above public key encryption scheme, and Ui’s
key pair be denoted as (PKi, SKi). The algorithms Aut is identical to that in
the original cryptosystem, but the Com algorithm is defined as follows.
• Com(Ci,C j,Ti,T j): This algorithm outputs 1 if C(4)i − H2((C
(2)
i
)Ti) ≡
C
(4)
j
− H2((C(2)j )
T j) (mod p) or 0 otherwise.
Note that the enhancement does not incur any more work for the compari-
son algorithm compared with the original scheme.
As to this enhanced cryptosystem, the OW-CCA and IND-CCA proper-
ties still hold, and their security proofs are exactly the same as in Theorem
1 and Theorem 2. If a proxy is given Ut’s ciphertext Enc(M,PKt) and token
Tt (i.e. yt), then it can obtain H2((UH(M))2
L
mod Q · T). To test anyM′, the
most efficient approach for the proxy is to compute (UH(M′))2L mod Q · T
and perform a comparison. Since every test will cost L multiplications,
then, by setting an appropriate L, the offline message recovery attack will
be made computationally very expensive. Suppose that the size of the ac-
tual message space is not very small, this approach will deter the attack to
some extent.
It is worth noting that, in this enhanced cryptosystem, the encryptor
needs to perform Lmultiplications to mask the message in the encryption.
This may be a computational bottleneck for some application scenarios.
How to overcome this drawback while still mitigating the attack is an
interesting future work.
5 A Secure Internet-based PHR Application
In this section, we first present an overview of existing Internet-based PHR
systems and point out the security risks. Then, based on AoN-PKEET, we
propose a secure Internet-based PHR application, which allows patients to
encrypt their data yet can still enjoy some sort of recommendation services.
17
5.1 Overview of Internet-based PHR Systems
A PHR is typically a collection of health data maintained by an individual,
referred to as a patient. Recently, Internet-basedPHR systemshave received
a lot of attention, some examples include Google Health [19] and Microsoft
HealthVault [20]. Internet-based PHR systems typically help patients store
their PHRs and allow the information to be accessed and edited via a web
browser or some APIs, and they may also help patients find kindred spirits
(i.e. build social networks) and share their information. Figure 4 shows a
general picture of an Internet-based PHR system.
Figure 4: An Illustration of Outsourced PHRs
Considering a patient, say Alice, her PHR data can come from a lot of
sources. From example, she can get prescription results from her doctor,
treatments from a hospital, test results from a laboratory, and monitoring
results from home-based sensors. In many systems, such as Google Health
and Microsoft HealthVault, a lot of Alice’s PHR data may be directly sent
to Alice’s account, while the rest will be input by Alice herself.
In most existing Internet-based PHR systems, patients will be provided
privacy controls. However, there are a number of concerns which stop
patients from sharing their data. One concern is that the system providers,
say Microsoft or Google, are always able to fully access the data. Although
there will be some privacy agreement, but patients may still worry about
that these providers may abuse their data. The other concern is that, even
if the service providers behave honestly, their databases may be compro-
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mised, in which case all data may be leaked. Since PHRs are sensitive
information to individuals, and an information leakage may cause undesir-
able consequences, such as being discriminated by the potential employer
because of a disease.
5.2 The Proposed Application
With an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem, a PHR application can be built as fol-
lows. Alice generates a key pair (PKa, SKa) and publishes PKa. When an
entity, say a hospital or a laboratory, wants to contribute Alice’s PHR data
into the PHR system, it encrypts the data using PKa and sends the cipher-
text to Alice’s account in the system. When Alice wants to match her PHR
data with that of others, she can choose a semi-trusted entity as a proxy
and assign her token. Later on, if other users also choose the same proxy
then PHR data matching can be done through running the Com algorithm.
The security of this application lies in the fact that patients’ PHR data is
always encrypted with their own public keys. Even if the storage of the
PHR system is compromised, no informationwill be leaked. With respect to
the semi-trusted proxies, in some extreme cases as discussed in Section 2.4,
they may be able to obtain some side information about patients’ PHR data
from mounting an offline message recovery attack. But, when a cryptosys-
tem such as that in Section 4 is used, the risk of offline message recovery
attack can be reduced. It is worth noting that the above proposal serves as
an example on how to use AoN-PKEET. In practice, it may be augmented
with other security mechanisms to obtain a more secure PHR application.
As mentioned before, PHR data may be contributed by many different
sources. We note that this may cause a problem in practice: data from
different sources may have different forms or even been truncated. In this
happens, the proposed solution of using AoN-PKEET to comparemessages
in an exact manner may not be desirable. To overcome this problem, we
may have two methods, which can be employed in parallel in practice.
• One is to standardize data representations in the system, and make
sure that all data contributors represent data in the same form.
• The other is to use an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem, which supports
fuzzy comparison. In fact, the proposed AoN-PKEET scheme in Sec-
tion 3 supports certain types of fuzzy comparison. Recall that the
comparison algorithm is defined as follows:
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– Com(Ci,C j,Ti,T j): This algorithm outputs 1 if X = Y or 0 other-
wise, where
X = C
(4)
i
· g−H2((C
(2)
i
)Ti ), Y = C
(4)
j
· g
−H2((C(2)j )
Tj )
.
Note that Ci is an encryption ofMi and C j is an encryption ofM j.
In the above algorithm, we have X = gMi and Y = gM j . Hence, for
any integer h, the proxy can test whether Mi = M j + h by evaluat-
ing whether X = Y · gh. As a result, the proxy can perform certain
types of fuzzy comparison in a brute-force manner. For example, if
the messages are treated as integers, the proxy can test whether the
Euclidean distance between Mi and M j, namely |Mi −M j| is below a
threshold. For the proposed solution, this kind of fuzzy comparison
support may suffice.
We note that, with the proposed AoN-PKEET scheme, it may not be
easy to perform other types of fuzzy comparison, such as based on
the metric of the hamming distance between messages. We leave it
as a future work to further investigate fuzzy comparisons with AoN-
PKEET.
6 Other Related Work
In the literature, there have been enormous research efforts to investigate
encryption techniques that support operations on encrypted data. Next,
we provide a brief review on some related work to ours.
The concept of PKEEThas a close nature to that of Public key encryption
with keyword search (PEKS) [6] and public key encryption with registered
keyword search (PERKS) [16]. With a PEKS or PERKS scheme, a user can
enable a server to perform equality test between the keywords embedding
in a tag and a ciphertext, and the user enforces her authorization by issuing
a token to the server. The difference is that, instead of keywords, PKEET
is concerned with the equality test of plaintexts which are encrypted under
different public keys. Another related concept is order preserving encryp-
tion (OPE) scheme, which is a primitive firstly proposed by Agrawal et al.
[1] and then further investigated by Boldyreva et al. [5]. With an OPE
scheme, the order of ciphertexts always remains the same as that of the
corresponding plaintexts. Therefore, given a set of ciphertexts, any entity
can directly compare the plaintexts. The order-preserving property of an
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OPE scheme holds only for the ciphertexts generated under the same public
key, which differs from the purpose of PKEET.
The concept of PKEET also shares some similarity with that of proxy
re-encryption (PRE) [4, 11]. With a PRE cryptosystem, a delegator Alice can
issue a re-encryptionkey to a proxy so that theproxy can convert ciphertexts
encrypted under Alice’s public key into ciphertextswhich can be decrypted
by a delegatee Bob. During the re-encryption process, the proxy will learn
nothing about the involved plaintexts. Yet, another related concept is ho-
momorphic encryption, which is first proposed by Rivest, Adleman, and
Dertouzos [13], and investigated by many others, e.g. ElGamal [9], Pailler
[12], Gentry [10]. With a homomorphic encryption scheme, given two ci-
phertexts, any entity can compute a new ciphertext which is an encryption
of the addition/multiplication/XOR/· · · of the plaintexts in the given cipher-
text, depending on the homomorphic property. It worth noting that, for
both PRE and homomorphic encryption, the proxy and any third party are
not allowed to learn any information about the involved plaintexts. This
property also differs from the purpose of PKEET, in which the proxy learns
the equality status of the encrypted plaintexts.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a formulation and a construction for AoN-
PKEET, namely public key encryption schemes which support plaintext
equality test and user-specified authorization. Compared with PKEET for-
mulated in [18], AoN-PKEET introduces a simple authorizationmechanism
for users to specify who can perform plaintext equality test from their ci-
phertexts. We believe that AoN-PKEETwill be an important building block
in designing privacy protection solutions (e.g. secure PHR applications)
supporting operations on encrypted data. There are many interesting fu-
ture works, including the following.
• In the security model for AoN-PKEET, we do not consider the con-
sistency property of the encryption. Take the proposed scheme as
an example, there is no way for the proxy to check whether C =
(C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)) is a valid ciphertext or not, where
u, v ∈R Zp, C
(1) = gu, C(2) = gv, C(3) = H1(gux) ⊕M||u,
C(4) = gH2(g
vy)+M′ , C(5) = H3(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M||u).
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Clearly, given thatM ,M′, then C is not a valid ciphertext. We notice
that this issue exists for the PKEET scheme proposed by Yang et al.
[18] and the primitive in [25]. In addition, we notice that similar issue
exists for the existing hybrid primitive of PEKS and PKE schemes,
e.g. [26], where the encrypted keywords and messages may not be
consistent with each other.
Though, the lack of this consistency will not affect the confidential-
ity of the data for AoN-PKEET, it may become a problem in some
applications. For instance, a malicious message sender can generate
an inconsistent encryption as shown above, then the proxy will gen-
erate wrong comparison results. We foresee two directions to solve
this problem. One is to formalize a consistency property in the se-
curity model of AoN-PKEET and propose new schemes with such
a property. The other one is, for the application which requires this
property, to investigate auxiliary countermeasures to be used together
with AoN-PKEET. For example, one possible countermeasure could
be to record the connection between the message sender and themes-
sages he has generated. If an inconsistent encryption is detected, then
the message sender can be punished. We leave further investigation
of the issue to be a future research work.
• In Section 5.2, we have noted that the proposed AoN-PKEET scheme
may support certain types of fuzzy comparison but may not support
other types of fuzzy comparison, such as that based on the metric of
the hamming distance between messages. Here, we also note that
fuzzy comparison cannot be achieved by the enhanced AoN-PKEET
scheme described in Section 4 because themessages are hashed in C
(4)
i
and C
(4)
j
. We leave it as a future work to further investigate AoN-
PKEET schemes which support different types of fuzzy comparison.
Moreover, for such schemes, it is an interesting research work is to
investigate countermeasures against offline message recovery attacks
against a Type-I adversary.
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